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Abstract
This paper considers the optimal management of exchange rate target
zones by regarding the operation of a target zone as a dynamic signalling
game between the monetary authorities and the financial markets. A Se-
quential Open Loop (Feedback) policy of sterilised intervention is proposed
that depends critically on the evolution of the policy maker’s credibility as op-
posed to the open loop precommitment strategy that has been implemented,
for instance, in the Exchange Rate Mechanism of the EMS and in the Bretton
Woods system. The width of the target zone and re-alignments are in turn
determined optimally given the policy maker’s credibility. This flexible target
!This paper is a substantially revised version of an earlier paper with the same title. The
revisions in this version have been stimulated by the consideration of the design of crawling pegs
as in place in countries such as Hungary. Work on this revision was carried out while the third
author was involved in an ACE project; P96-6149-R on Policy Making in a small open economy
aimed at joining the European Union. We thank the partners on this project, in particular Axel
Weber and Istvan Szekely, for a number of discussions on the issues raised by the formal design
of Crawling Bands. A further revision of this paper which also considers the optimal rate of
depreciation as well as the band width is currently in progress.
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zone proposal is shown through simulation to stabilize the exchange rate to
a substantial degree while retaining considerable flexibility and robustness in
response to shocks.
Key Words: Exchange Rate Target Zones, Credibility, Flexibility, Ster-
ilised Intervention, Signalling, Dynamic Policy Games.
1 Introduction
The history of international monetary arrangements from the Gold Standard through
BrettonWoods to the Exchange RateMechanism of the EMS has been characterised
by periodic recourse to what have in e!ect been target zones for exchange rates,
although at times obviously with such narrow band widths that they are consid-
ered fixed exchange rate systems. The open loop precommitment to maintaining
an exchange rate within such bands has led to rigid and inflexible systems that over
time lose credibility and eventually collapse. Yet there is no inherent theoretical
reason why target zones if properly managed need to collapse. The dependence on
a strategy of open loop precommitment would seem to be based on the misplaced
belief that only such policies can attract credibility and that feedback strategies or
flexible target zones, that respond the state of the economic system and recognise
asymmetric shocks, would either not stabilise exchange rates or not be seen to be
credible by the financial markets.
While the underlying reasons for the loss of credibility in previous systems may
have di!ered there appears to be no well developed theory for the operation of
such target zones that may prevent periodic crises and the ensuing instability in
financial markets1. This paper seeks to provide one such theory that rests on
endogenising the credibility of the policy maker within the target zone and requires
that his policy actions with respect to the maintenance of the target zone are
1Calls to widen the 1% bandwidths of the Bretton Woods System so as to make it more flexible
and less “ brittle” were clear in the mid 1960’s, see Bergsten et al [1970], the “ Burgenstock Papers”
but there was little theoretical rationalisation for the extent to which the bands should be widened.
JohnWilliamson [1983],[1986],[1987],[1989] has more recently called for the establishment of target
zones for the world’s major currencies and his proposals have much in common with the flexible
target zone model we develop below.
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determined by this credibility. Of course, the objective of requiring the relative
fixity of exchange rates has been seen as one part of a wider context which involves
the coordination of monetary and fiscal policies internationally and ultimately it
may only be the success or failure of such coordination that determines the viability
of any partially fixed exchange rate system. However given the ever present concern
that freely floating exchange rates demonstrate excessive volatility and sustained
misalignments from equilibrium it would seem there is a clear need to consider
how such target zones may be optimally managed with feedback policies within the
context of internationally coordinated economic policy.
The recent technical literature on stochastic target zone models, following the
formalisation o!ered by Krugman [1991]2, has not yet addressed a number of im-
portant practical issues such as the optimal width of a target zone3 or the manner
by which realignments may be optimally carried out to pre-empt such attacks that
led to the events in the EMS during 1992/3. Since both of these issues can be seen
to depend on the credibility of the system it would appear necessary to consider an
explicit mechanism that determines the policy-maker’s credibility and its evolution.
This is all the more important given that the process which determines the financial
market’s expectations is central and generates the so called “ honeymoon e!ect”
which provides one of the basic raison d’être for exchange rate target zones. Sec-
ondly there is a need to consider the trade o! that exists between a policy-maker’s
basic desire for flexibility (i.e. divergence in monetary policy) and credibility in
terms of the degree of stabilization o!ered by a given band width. Incorporating
these elements into the analysis of target zones provides a clearer understanding of
the stresses that operate within a rigid target zone system and indicates how such
systems could be reformed and managed4.
In this paper we consider these issues by formulating the problem as a stage-wise
signalling game through sterilised intervention between the financial markets and
the policy-maker. This approach is distinct but has obvious similarities in objectives
2See for instance the volume edited by Krugman and Miller[1992]
3It is, for instance, interesting to note how often a band width of 21
4
% has appeared historically
without apparently any formal justification. This band width was suggested both at the time the
reform of Bretton Woods was considered, in the “Snake” and of course more recently in the ERM.
4We stress at the outset that we see the issue of how to determine the central parity in a
target zone as depending on the wider policy issues involving policy coordination which we do not
consider in this paper and which the target zone alone may not be able to achieve.
3
with the analysis of realignments provided, for instance, by Miller andWeller [1989],
Bertola and Caballero [1991],[1992] and Dri"ll and Miller [1993] amongst others.
However, in this work on realignments, the analysis of credibility has invariably
been implicit rather than explicit and moreover it has not been developed within
an optimising model of exchange rate policy. It is the evolution of credibility and
the dynamic implications of partial credibility on policy within a target zone that
largely determines the sustainability of the target zone system given international
coordination of policy and the ensuing choice of central parity in the band.
It appears that central bank intervention is, in reality, relatively frequent, oc-
curs intra-marginally and is largely, if not completely, sterilised 5. Hence we depart
from standard target zone models in the way that we consider the monetary au-
thorities acting so as to influence the exchange rate through frequent fully sterilised
intervention which leaves the fundamentals una!ected. The role of such interven-
tion in signalling and hence adjusting the market’s expectations of future monetary
policy or the policy maker’s preferences has been considered, more generally, by a
number of authors, see for instance, Dominguez [1992] and Dominguez K.M. and
J.A. Frankel [1993]. While these aspects are built into our model of the mone-
tary authority’s behaviour we also allow the authority to use direct unsterilised
intervention on the fundamentals at the margins of the band which again seems to
correspond well with reality.
In the next section we describe how partial credibility may be introduced into
the standard forward looking target zone model. We distinguish between two forms
of credibility, absolute and relative. Absolute credibility refers essentially to the ab-
solute degree of commitment the policy-maker makes to exchange rate stabilisation.
So a free float regime would correspond to zero commitment or absolute credibility
and a fixed exchange rate regime would correspond to full commitment or perfect
absolute credibility. We assume full absolute credibility is gained from an extra-
neous commitment or an institutional agreement that ensures full credibility and
hence it serves as the natural base from which partially (absolute) credible target
zones may be gauged. Relative credibility on the other hand refers to the degree of
confidence the markets hold in the particular announced exchange rate band which
5See inter alia Weber[1994] or Mastropasqua et al[1989] for an analysis of sterilised intervention
within the ERM and Rogo! (1984) for evidence of the absence of a portfolio balance e!ect from
sterilised intervention.
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lies somewhere between the free float and the fixed regimes. So given any particular
band-width the corresponding target zone may obtain full relative credibility while
only representing partial absolute credibility.
It is important to notice that the policy maker’s commitment in our frame-
work is intended to be much weaker than that assumed in the standard target zone
model. The policy maker’s initial announcement corresponds to a commitment to
direct policy, both inside the band limits and at the margins, towards the objective
of keeping the exchange rate within the announced band given the shocks hitting
the system. While this is clearly a much weaker commitment than usual it may
still be fully credible and indeed it may be easier to be more credible with a weaker
commitment. The possibility of the exchange rate passing beyond the announced
limits on the exchange rate for a period is not precluded in our model as we demon-
strate below, and we therefore provide one formalisation of the notion of “ Soft
Bu!ers” originally put forward by John Williamson [1983].
Having drawn this distinction between absolute and relative credibility we then
describe, in section 3, how we view the financial market forming its expectations in
the aggregate given an underlying atomistic and heterogeneous structure in which
the monetary authority acts a single large player. The degree of market power
given to the policy maker in shifting the views of the market via his interventions
and other signals is determined by an explicit market power function that depends
on the relative credibility of the policy maker.
In section 4 the stage-wise asymmetric information game that exists between
the policy-maker and the markets is described. The policy-maker in general faces
a trade-o! between a desire for greater flexibility in monetary policy and a desire
to maintain credibility. Flexibility is obtained through a greater divergence in
fundamentals than would be consistent with the announced band width. Whereas a
loss in credibility results if the markets recognise any deviation from the announced
policy and adjust their expectations accordingly. When the markets recognise that
the policy-maker has lost all relative credibility they will ignore the existence of
the announced target zone and adjust their expectations removing the benefit of
the honeymoon e!ect by moving to the free float value of the exchange rate and
inducing a realignment of the band. The net benefit of the political costs incurred in
balancing this trade-o! between credibility and flexibility is weighed in the policy-
maker’s objective function together with the basic desire to stabilise the exchange
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rate around the central parity 6.
Finally we demonstrate the potential power of the proposed flexible target zone
structure to stabilise the exchange rate, through a series of simulation exercises,
before drawing some conclusions.
2 Partial Credibility and the Target Zone Model
Several attempts have been made to endogenise and formally introduce partial
credibility into the standard target zone model. Krugman [1991] and Pesenti [1991]
suggested a similar approach to modelling partial credibility to that we use below
as the weighted average of two solutions of the basic target zone model but they did
not develop their analysis so as to endogenise credibility nor did they consider the
policy implications for the management of a target zone as we do below. Bertola and
Svensson [1993] developed a model with time varying realignment risk with an ex-
ogeneous devaluation probability and Svensson [1991] describes a simple method of
assessing credibility in a target zone by checking whether expected future exchange
rates fall inside the announced band. Recent contributions that consider learn-
ing and the role of credibility to varying degrees are Dri"ll and Miller [1993] and
Cukierman et al. [1993],[1994]. Dri"ll and Miller, while considering the Bayesian
updating of realignment expectations, do not consider wider issues relating to the
private sector’s uncertainty about the government’s preferences and hence the evo-
lution of credibility in an optimising context. Cuckierman et al. [1993] develop an
analysis which has similar objectives to that given below, but they assume that all
the relevant dynamics take place outside the announced band and hence there are
no forward looking target zone dynamics and expectations are essentially regres-
sive. Cuckierman et al. [1994] is concerned with the trade-o! between credibility
and flexibility in stabilisation programs and does not consider target zones.
The “canonical” target zone model is based on two equations which specify the
evolution of the exchange rate s(t) as the present discounted value of expected
6One contribution of this paper lies in the analysis of the policy-maker’s loss function given in
section 4 since we deviate substantially from the proportional costs of intervention model that has
been considered elsewhere and which does not have a clear theoretical justification. For instance
Miller and Zhang [1994] developed an analysis of the benefits of precommitment over discretion
a target zone context with proportional costs of intervention while ignoring the evolution of
credibility
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fundamentals k(t) based on information available today:
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where ! is the semi-elasticity of money demand, and a law of motion for funda-
mentals,
dk(t) = #dt+ $dW (t) + d%+ + d%" (2)
where # is a given drift, $ is the di!usion parameter andW (t) is a standard Wiener
process. The terms d%+ and d%" represent unsterilised interventions the policy
maker applies to the fundamentals when they reach either the upper or lower limits
of the announced band. Given the basic model described in equation (1) there are
in principle only two ways in which the policy maker can a!ect the exchange rate,
either by direct action on the fundamentals or via the expectations operator. We
consider both channels of policy action below as we assume the presence of standard
marginal unsterilised inteventions but also sterilised intramarginal intervention7.
While our analysis includes both elements we emphasise the signalling channel
that a!ects the expectations operator noting that this latter route has largely been
ignored in the existing target zone literature. The $-algebra, Ft, summarizes the
information set available at time t, which as we emphasise below includes the degree
of credibility granted to the policy-maker and hence the band width profile the
market believes will be relevant in the future.
Each given pair of values for U and L, respectively the upper and lower limits
of the announced target zone defines the regime in place. A useful way to explicitly
indicate this dependence of the exchange rate path on the information available to
the financial markets is to re-express (1) as:
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which emphasises that the standard solution is conditional on a given band width
(U"L) and that the agents in the financial markets need to form their expectations
of the future course of fundamentals based on their perception of the distribution
of (future) band-widths given by p(U "L|#, $). In the standard target zone model
7General policy announcements or policy inaction may in fact be as powerful as policy action
in sending signals to the financial markets and thereby changing their expectations of future
government policy
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it is assumed that the policy-maker announces given values for U and L and his
intention to defend these limits which is regarded as being perfectly credible. If this
open loop pre-commitment loses credibility a realignment may in due course become
necessary leading to new values for U and L and the market will in reality start to
anticipate this when forming its expectations. A reaction which is not permitted in
the standard fully credible model. In our set up we assume that the market has to
learn the policy-maker’s degree of commitment to the announced band-width given
imperfect observations on his actions. His actions, through sterilised intervention
reflect the implicit band width the policy maker sees as being desirable at any point
in time. Hence the evolution of credibility will essentially turn on the ability of the
market to learn the band-width distribution which is also clearly the subject of the
policy-maker’s interest if he is seeking to manipulate the private sector’s beliefs. As
we describe below the policy maker will invariably have an incentive to cheat on
his initially announced band-width to gain greater flexibility in monetary policy.
If a fixed, fully credible and binding band, (U , L) given, is announced and placed
on the exchange rate, the standard derivation (see for instance Bertola [1993]) leads
to the following solution for the exchange rate:
s = gpc(k) = k + !# +Ae
!1(k"k) +Be!2(k"k) (4)
where k is the lower limit on the desired band for the fundamentals. If instead
the exchange rate is free to move unconstrained by a band then, given the earlier
assumptions, it will evolve as a random walk with a drift. In this free float case the
solution for the exchange rate is:
s = gff(k) = k + !# (5)
We identify the solution given in (4) with the subscript, pc , since it represents
the solution under the assumption that the announced band is perfectly credible
and given that it is obtained as the general solution to the following second order
di!erential equation with fixed coe"cients:
!$2
2
g##(k) + !#g#(k)" g(k) = "k (6)
where the roots
&1 = &1(!, $, #) &2 = &2(!, $, #) (7)
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with &1 > 0 and &2 < 0 are found from the quadratic equation;
&2!$2
2
+ &!# " 1 = 0 (8)
and the constants,
A = A(!, $, #, L, U) B = B(!,$, #, L, U) (9)
are determined together with k¯ and k from the following boundary conditions given
values for U and L:
g(k) = U g(k) = L g#(k) = 0 g#(k) = 0 (10)
The general form of gpc(k) then provides a family of individually perfectly credible
solutions as the band-width (U , L) and the corresponding boundary conditions
vary, as indicated in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Perfectly Credible Solutions with Di!erent Band Widths
We also obtain, for each band—width on the exchange rate, an implied band on
the movement of the fundamentals, (k and k) which can then be interpreted as the
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range of policy independence granted to policymakers for a given choice of exchange
rate band. As the width of the band on the exchange rate increases the implied
band on the fundamentals becomes wider allowing a greater potential divergence
between the two economies.
Emphasising this flexibility to diverge in fundamentals provides a slightly dif-
ferent interpretation for the original policy problem facing the monetary authority.
A free float is characterized by what is, in e!ect, a potentially unbounded devia-
tion between the fundamentals of the two countries but at the same time it su!ers
from the lack of any positive feedback stabilisation induced through the market’s
forward looking expectations given the existence of a perfectly credible band; the
honeymoon e!ect . A tighter band-width in a fully credible target zone constrains
domestic monetary policy more but induces a greater stabilising e!ect on the ex-
change rate than a wider band. On the one hand the policy-maker wants to have
the greatest degree of stabilisation provided by the markets themselves through the
honeymoon e!ect while on the other he would like to have the greatest freedom
in domestic monetary policy8. One way of viewing the question of credibility in a
target zone can then be seen as the temptation facing a policy-maker to exploit his
established credibility for supporting the announced band-width while adopting a
domestic policy position and intervention strategy that is ultimately inconsistent
with the implied degree of flexibility o!ered by the announced band. This gain in
flexibility can be seen in Figure 1 as a movement towards the free float solution.
Given that it is costly to establish and maintain a reputation the policy maker may
at any instant prefer to exploit some of his prior investment in credibility and allow
the exchange rate and fundamentals to move away from the perfectly credible path.
The policy maker is faced with this temptation at the risk that the financial markets
may perceive this deviation as implying a lack of will to support the announced
band.
Let us consider the compromise facing the policy-maker more closely. As sug-
gested above the trade-o! between flexibility and stabilising the exchange rate in
e!ect represents a choice between two alternative solutions with di!erent band-
widths from the family given above in (3) including the free float solution which is
also a member of this family. Moving towards a position that would be consistent
8It is this compromise of course that has provided the argument for the disciplinary mechanism
of the EMS.
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with a wider band-width then represents a loss in credibility with a gain in flexi-
bility that can be seen from Figure 1 either as a relaxation in the need to intervene
or greater ultimate range of monetary freedom, k " k. To model the degree of
credibility we can then consider linear combinations of any two members of this
family representing relatively constrained and unconstrained solutions where the
weight applied, w(t), 0 $ w(t) $ 1, is time varying and measures the degree of
absolute credibility (A-credibility) corresponding to the degree of commitment to
exchange rate stabilization9. Notice that any convex combination of two solutions
of the original family of solutions is also a member of the original family but with
a di!erent band width both on the fundamentals and the exchange rate.
Zero absolute credibility is then given by the free float solution and full absolute
credibility is given by what we refer to as a fixed exchange rate regime that at-
tains its full credibility from an extraneous commitment device or institution. This
“fully” A-credibile solution could also of course correspond to Monetary Union and
so we are also interested in considering how the band-width can be systematically
reduced given the evolution of credibility and the existence of policy coordination to
remove the pressure from divergent fundamentals. The class of partially A-credible
solutions to the target zone is then given by:
gw(k) = wgpc(k) + (1" w)gff(k) = k + !# + w[Ae
!1(k"k) +Be!2(k"k)] (11)
The intuition should be clear in that a high value of w ensures that more weight
is given to the fixed regime and less to the free float solution and by decreasing w
we are able to recover all the solutions which could be found by defining increasing
widths for the exchange rate band. For each of these solutions we will have a series
of kw, kw which are further and further apart. Each of these di!erent target zones,
while having limited absolute credibility in principle correspond to a particular
policy choice through a band-width announced by the policy maker, wa, given his
loss function in a process we discuss more fully in the next section.
We now define relative credibility (R-credibility) as the degree of commitment
to this announced target zone as reflected in the realised exchange rate in the
market. We need to distinguish between these two distinct notions of credibility
in describing the strategic game since target zones with di!erent band-widths (i.e.,
9To simplify the notation, from now on reference will be made to w, rather than w(t), keeping
implicit the dependence on time.
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di!erent A-credibility) may equally be fully credibile (same R-credibility). So we
choose absolute credibility to describe the “ absolute” degree of stabilisation aimed
for and “relative” credibility to describe the perceived degree of commitment to
this absolute objective. The simplest expression for relative credibility is then just
the ratio between the band width implied by the current observed exchange rate
and that originally announced. This follows immediately from (11) as;
rct =
w
wa
=
st " gff(kt)
ga(kt)" gff(kt)
= 1"
st " ga(kt)
gff(kt)" ga(kt)
(12)
Figure 2 characterises this nonlinear function in terms of the divergence between
the observed exchange rate and that expected given the announced band. We can
see in particular that rc = 1 when s = ga(k), and rc = 0 for s = gff ; a symmetric
function holds for the lower part of the band.
Figure 2: Relative Credibility
In the absence of learning the policy maker could expect to hold full relative
credibility when he adheres to the (s, k) mapping consistent with the initially an-
nounced band-width, ie. along the path A (s = ga(k)) in the left hand subpanel
of the figure. Beneath this “s-mapping” he may actually increase his credibility as
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he would be potentially adopting a tighter intervention or monetary policy than
required given his initial announcement. Such credibility building is important if
we wish to consider how policy can be directed towards achieving a narrower band.
Above the path A, there will be a loss of relative credibility, in the region AB, which
becomes more dramatic as the exchange rate passes over the upper threshold of the
announced band, Ua, through B and into the region BC. The policy-maker achieves
both zero relative and absolute credibility when the exchange rate coincides with
the free float value.
An important element of the flexible target zone being put forward is that it
captures in some respects Williamson’s “ Soft Bu!ers” in that fundamental in-
tervention is not necessarily required when the exchange rate passes through the
upper or lower limits of the announced target zone but only when the fundamentals
themselves breach either their announced upper or the lower limits. In the fully
credible target zone model these two points will coincide but they do not in our
partially credible case as will become apparent below. Moreover unlike the perfectly
credible target zone a speculative attack will not necessarily emerge immediately
when the exchange rate bands are breached as the policy maker will still retain a
degree of credibility and only as this credibility evaporates will the market move
rapidly towards the free float solution. However if the policy maker recognises this
cost of losing credibility in his policy optimisation it should lead him to act more
conservatively before the exchange rate crosses the band limits and hence intervene
earlier to send the appropriate signals to the market and eventually to use direct
unsterilised intervention on the fundamentals. How fast relative credibility is lost
and hence how rapidly a speculative attack is built up is determined by the slope
of the relative credibility function in the range betweenBC in Figure 2.
So, in this framework, the monetary authority can be seen to have the incentive
to exploit its established reputation by moving away from the announced exchange
rate-fundamentals path into the region AB in Figure 2 and possibly even into region
BC in order to gain a degree of monetary independence. If the financial markets
could observe or interpret the policy-maker’s actions directly and with certainty
there would be no game to be played. However we assume that they are in general
unable to directly observe the interventions the monetary authorities make or able
to precisely infer the band-width it implicitly uses when accomodating domestic
shocks through domestic monetary policy or when intervening. An assumption
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that would seem to correspond well with reality given the evidence that exists as
to how central banks intervene at times.
The realised exchange rate is then assumed to be determined by that value of
w that arises from a weighted average of the financial markets’ aggregate estimate
of the band-width, wˆg, and that employed implicitly by the policy-maker, wg ;
w = '(rct)wg + (1" '(rct))wˆg (13)
The weighting parameter '(rct), represents the degree of market power held by the
government in the determination of the exchange rate and it is natural that this
should depend on the degree of relative credibility ascribed by the market to the
policy maker. The parameter w, measuring the e!ective band width, determines the
expectations operator which in turn determines the exchange rate through equation
(1) or equivalently equation(11). Equation (13) could therefore be re-interpreted as
the aggregation of positions taken about the exchange rate in the market leading
to the realised exchange rate through the use of w (in the expectations operator) .
Initially, with no deviation from wa, market power will be a constant, determined by
the degree of absolute credibility, and wg = wˆg and hence from (13) wa = wg = wˆg.
However when the policy-maker chooses to deviate from wa he will in e!ect be
willing to give more power to the financial markets. Eventually the policy-maker
could in this way lose complete control of the exchange rate as his relative credibility
collapsed.
Individual agents in the financial markets are assumed not to know the exact
value of 't since we regard the market as being heterogeneous and atomistic. As
they are faced with the exchange rate being determined, at each point in time,
e!ectively through equation (13) which involves two unknowns, 't and wg, indi-
vidual agents in the market are unable to identify the policy maker’s actions and
therefore intentions exactly 10 . It is this aspect of asymmetric information that
provides the leverage which the monetary authorities may exploit in the strate-
gic game below. Notice that we assume the policy maker does have knowledge of
'(rct) for two reasons; in the first place being a single large player in the market he
recognises his potential to control the market, an opportunity which is not available
10It is well documented in the literature how di"cult it is, at times, to precisely determine the
monetary authorities actions in the foreign exchange markets. At other times they clearly wish
to advertise the fact that they are intervening or feel the exchange rate is at an “inappropriate
level”, see Dominguez and Frankel (1993) and references therein.
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to the individual smaller traders. Secondly we assume the monetary authorities,
through their regulatory role, have the ability to monitor events in the market and
the market as a whole more e!ectively than the individual traders. The function,
't, that determines the degree of e!ective market power reflects certain intuitive
consistency conditions such as ensuring that when the policy-maker has full relative
credibility the exchange rate will, in large part, be determined by beliefs consistent
with wg and when it has lost all relative credibility then the expectations of the
market, i.e. the free float value of the exchange rate, will dominate. The atomistic
nature of the market could be formalised further by letting the individual agents
hold heterogeneous rational beliefs as in Kurz (1994)11. In particular since it is
the wide heterogeneity of individual beliefs in the market that gives the policy
maker its power it would be interesting to explore the implications more formally
when beliefs in the market converged on a single view as the strategic nature of
the game would then be radically altered. However the essential elements we need
at present are given by the structure assumed above. In principle any monotonic
increasing function of relative credibility such as the following exponential form,
and shown in Figure 3, captures the required e!ects on market power and is used
in the simulations below.
'(rct) = 1" e
rct(ln(1"")) (14)
11Some recent work along similar lines has been done by Alberola[1994].
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Figure 3: Market Power
The fixed value ( determines the degree of control over market power held by
the monetary authority when it has full relative credibility. Notice that this can
also be interpreted as the market power held by those in the market whose beliefs
coincide with the monetary authority and not necessarily just the authority itself.
3 The Financial Markets and the Adjustment of
Expectations
There are two aspects to the financial markets’ aggregate expectation formation
problem.
(i) The choice of wˆg reflecting absolute and hence relative credibility;
(ii) The use of the (s, k) mapping corresponding to the selected value of wˆg.
Notice first that the use of the (s, k) mapping corresponding to the value of wˆg
estimated by the markets is formally correct since each implicit band width implied
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by wˆg is by definition fully credible from the market’s point of view. Hence the
appropriate mathematical function to use to determine the market’s expectation of
the exchange rate is that given by the standard solution given by (11). It can also
be seen from (13) that the expected value of w given '(rct) is simply wˆg hence the
private sector minimises their mean square forecast errors on the exchange rate by
determining their best estimate of wg. In reality it almost certainly takes time to
build reputation, therefore the evolution of credibility must have some stickyness.
In addition the markets are faced with the di"cult task of predicting the evolution of
wg which is a non-linear function of the state of a system which is itself continuously
changing. Moreover they do not have direct observations on the quantity they are
trying to estimate wg, only on the observed exchange rate.
This is quite a di!erent type of expectation formation and signal extraction
problem than considered in the monetary policy and inflation games considered
by Cuckierman and Meltzer [1990] and Basar and Salmon [1990]. In that class
of problems the markets were left with the problem of estimating the evolution
of a stochastic policy preference parameter which follows a fixed law of motion.
The natural approach in that case was to let the market learn this policy prefer-
ence parameter through the Wiener or Kalman filters. These filters are justified
as optimal in the mean square sense and correspond with this quadratic loss to
the use of unconditional and conditional expectations for the unknown parameters.
Given the stable linear environment a learning mechanism based on those filters
converges as the Kalman Gain e!ectively goes towards zero and credibility reaches
its steady state value. Intuitively this means that the learning algorithm turns
o! when all parameters in the fixed structure have been estimated. In our case
this is would be clearly suboptimal as the structure generating the exchange rate
is in reality changing over time as the band width implicitly being tracked moves
with the policy-maker’s optimisation problem. In this non-constant environment
it is important that the learning algorithm adopted by the financial markets has
the capability to track this instability and does not turn itself o! as time passes.
Optimal learning schemes in this nonlinear, time varying situation are derived from
the theory of stochastic approximation and we propose that the market uses an
algorithm of this type when attempting to minimise its prediction error loss func-
tion12. Therefore we specify that in the aggregate the market learns by adjusting
12see White [1992],Kuan and White [1991], [1994] and Robbins and Munro [1951].
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its previous estimate of wˆg using the following stochastic approximation algorithm:
dwˆg = )t(w " wˆg) dt (15)
where )t measures the “viscosity” of the financial market which we assume is a
constant rather than decreasing to zero at rate T"1/2 and thereby ensure continuous
learning. The use of the term viscosity is intentional as it indicates the speed with
which we assume an atomistic and heterogeneous market can process information
e"ciently. This learning mechanism is clearly an essential element in a signalling
game of the type we have envisaged above and indeed the monetary authorities at
various times in reality do make a clear decision to make public their interventions
in the market. Hence the parameter )t could be seen to change depending on
how discrete the authorities wished to be in their actions and hence how fast the
market was able to learn. Alternatively )t could be state dependent and itself reflect
relative credibility as in adaptive learning schemes, see Marimon and McGratten
[1994].The information set the individual agents have available is the inferred value
of w from the observed values of the exchange rate and the fundamentals. This
in turn depends on the unobserved wg through equation (13) and the learning
mechanism can in fact then be written as;
dwˆg = )t'(rct)(wg " wˆg) dt (16)
This formulation allows us to see how relative credibility directly a!ects the fi-
nancial markets ability to learn. Given the nonlinearity, when the policy-maker
has low reputation he must make a much greater e!ort proportionately to recover
his reputation than if he had a high degree of credibility. We may a priori have
expected that as the level of relative credibility decreased with the exchange rate
perhaps being close to, or beyond, the limit of the announced band the markets
may more rapidly adjust their expectations. However learning about wg slows down
somewhat paradoxically when the market power is low as there is less information
in the observed exchange rate regarding the policy maker’s actions and wg. The
exchange rate is dominated by the market’s beliefs as it moves to the free float
value of the exchange rate and the policy maker must work harder to re-establish
its reputation than if he had a high degree of relative credibility. Similarly when
relative credibility is close to unity then we can expect a relatively fast adjustment
of expectations and again the '(rct) function which maps relative credibility into
the (0, 1) interval will pick these e!ects up.
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Finally with this estimated value of the band-width parameter the financial
markets will in aggregate, use the standard forward looking target zone mapping
between the fundamentals and the exchange rate to generate its forecast of the
exchange rate which is then combined e!ectively with the policy-maker’s forecast
through the market power function (13) to generate the observed exchange rate
given the observed fundamentals.
4 The Strategic Game with the Markets
As in a standard asymmetric information Stackelberg game we assume we start
from an initially announced and credible band on the exchange rate determined
by U ,L or wa. The market then forms its expectations of the exchange rate so
as to minimise its mean squared forecast error taking into account the observed
exchange rate, the policy-maker’s credibility and the initial announcement. The
policy-maker then optimises an objective function at each point in time given the
private sector’s expectations to determine the band-width he will implicitly use to
set his policy actions ( sterilised intervention, policy announcements or inaction) in
the next period. In doing so he will trade-o! the potential costs of reneging on his
initial announcement and the potentially increased volatility in the exchange rate
against the benefits of gaining extra monetary freedom13. The policy maker also has
a direct incentive to reinforce his credibility if he wishes to maintain the stabilising
influence of the honeymoon e!ect consistent with the announced band-width. In
adjusting their expectations the agents in the financial markets may reduce the
policy-maker’s credibility and hence also the degree of stabilisation provided by the
honeymoon e!ect.
Given that the reputational costs of reneging on the announced policy are ex-
plicitly taken into account in the monetary authority’s policy optimisation problem
described above the solution that follows represents a sequential open loop strat-
egy which characterises a feedback policy from which at any point in time there
would be no incentive to renege. The use of such innovations contingent policies to
13The structure of this strategic game between the policy-maker and the financial markets
reflects exactly the analysis of credibility and reputation in the optimal monetary policy and
inflation problem studied by Barro and Gordon [1986], Cuckierman and Meltzer [1990] and Basar
and Salmon[1990] amongst others.
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mimic feedback policy in forward looking models has been considered for instance
by Buiter [1981] and adaptive policies of this kind have a long history in control
theory, see for instance, Tse [1974].
As explained above the essential element of asymmetric information in this
process lies in that individual agents in the financial markets are not able to exactly
recover the actions of the policy-maker. If an asymmetric shock hits the exchange
rate moving it away from the expected relationship with the fundamentals as shown
in either small panel in Figure 2, the market will, being uncertain as to whether the
policy maker has acted consistently with his declared policy or not, start to revise
its view that the policy-maker is perfectly credible in his intention to ultimately
defend the announced band. Hence some weight will be added to the opinion that
the policy-maker would like to have greater flexibility in managing the evolution of
its own fundamentals and the market reduces its estimate of wg and gives a larger
weight to the free float solution compared with the originally announced band. The
observed exchange rate is then determined through the band-width that results from
the market power relation (13). If the policymaker does not in due course undertake
adjustments which bring the exchange rate back to the credible path, he has to be
ready either to bear larger costs when the exchange rate hits the limit of the band
or pay a political cost in order to obtain an realignment of the initially announced
band and hence reduce his level of absolute credibility. The policy-maker therefore
recognises at each point a cost which is the present discounted value of the credibility
gap measured on the boundary for the announced wa. When the exchange rate is
close to the central parity, a small deviation from the perfectly credible path implies
a large deviation at the boundary and this implies a big reduction in the flexibility
enjoyed by the policymaker. The existence of an “anticipative” political cost of
this type connected with deviation from the credible path should encourage early
adjustment and intra-marginal intervention.
4.1 The Structure of the Objective Function
The general strategic aspects in the game between the policy-maker and the markets
have been outlined above but the critical element in this game is clearly the nature
of the policy-maker’s objective function. We assume that the policy-maker has five
considerations in mind at each point in time;
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(i) a basic desire to stabilise the volatility of exchange rate movements,
(ii) a desire to prevent the exchange rate deviating from some absolute level that
may be a fixed central parity or a variable target o!ered by an estimate of
the FEER,
(iii) a temptation to gain more flexibility than is o!ered by the existing band and
degree of credibility,
(iv) a desire to reduce the political cost of the loss of credibility that may arise
when the markets learn that he has deviated from his announced policy, this
can also be seen to reflect the signalling costs,RCcost ,
(v) and finally a desire not to be forced to realign and thereby lose absolute
credibility, ACcost .
The objective function the policymaker seeks to maximize through his choice of
wg is then given by
J1(wg) = E
" T
0
e"#t
&
!1(s" s
e) + !2(
ds
dt
)2 + !3s
2 + !4RCcost + !5ACcost
'
dt
(17)
where !1 > 0 and !2,!3,!4,!5 < 0. At the same time the financial markets through
their expectation formation seek to minimize their prediction errors as suggested
in the following loss function,
J2(wˆg) =
" T
0
(s" se)2 dt (18)
which acts as a surrogate for more fundamental profit seeking motives presumably
driving behaviour in the financial markets.
The first term in the policy-maker’s objective function represents the incen-
tive to surprise the financial markets since it is through an exchange rate surprise
that the policy-maker ultimately gains flexibility. How does this come about? Two
immediate measures of flexibility could be put forward. The first is a direct compar-
ison of the increase in the potential divergence in the fundamentals from adopting
a band-width wg that is greater than that originally announced; in Figure 4 this
is indicated by, A, (k " k). The two points indicated, k and k , correspond to the
smooth pasting tangency points where the slope of the (s, k) mapping is, in each
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case, zero. This comparison reflects a potential increase in flexibility in the implied
range in the fundamentals since it is only meaningful when the announced band has
been broken. Essentially flexibility can then be seen to be reflected in the curvature
of the relevant (s, k) mappings at any particular reference point and an equivalent
measure within the announced or expected band can be given by the di!erence in
the level of fundamentals at which same observed gradient on the announced or ex-
pected (s, k) mapping occurs on a di!erent mapping; in Figure 4 this is indicated by
the distance, B, between kwˆg and k. In other words the increased flexibility comes
from adopting a band width for which the observed sensitivity in the exchange rate
(to changes in the fundamentals) occurs at a higher level of fundamentals diver-
gence than expected. However both these measures compare aspects of ex ante
or potential flexibility since they compare aspects of the observed fundamentals
divergence with another somewhat abstract level of fundamentals. Another com-
parison could be based on the di!erence between the observed exchange rate and
that consistent with the kwˆg value, D, in Figure 4. but again the degree of realised
flexibility should perhaps depend more naturally on the market’s belief as to the
relevant band-width, given the observed fundamentals position. Notice that two
(s, k) mappings are shown in Figure 4, one corresponding to the realised exchange
rate/fundamentals position and the other corresponding to the expected mapping
given the market’s expectation of wˆg. The easiest way to capture realised flexibility
and the one chosen here would then simply seem to be to calculate the di!erence
between the expected and observed level of the exchange rate at the observed level
of the fundamentals, i.e. the surprise in the exchange rate. This surprise value, C,
will in general understate the potential flexibility measure given by, D.
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Figure 4: Flexibility Measures
The second and third terms in the policy-maker’s welfare function simply indi-
cate that he wishes to minimise the volatility in the exchange rate and the deviation
of the exchange rate itself from some normalising position which we have chosen to
set equal to zero. The choice of the base or central parity clearly opens up a range
of fundamental questions which we do not attempt to address in this paper since
our objective is simply to consider the way in which partial credibility e!ects can
be modelled. These two terms represent the non-strategic elements in his welfare
function whereas the other three terms arise from the strategic game.
The fourth term represents the political costs (and benefits) from deviating from
the announced band. Within a given band we introduce two separate e!ects here
one for the upside risk and the other for the downside risk depending on whether
the actual exchange rate is above or below the announced level for the observed
level of fundamentals;
(i) When the policy maker contemplates a wider band width by choosing a
smaller value for w than that corresponding to the announced band-width we
measure political cost, as can be seen from Figure 5., by the implied amount
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of intervention that would be needed to return to full credibility. This can be
taken as the distance along the band between (k"kw), E, where kw represents
the intersection of the mapping on which the observed exchange rate lies and
the upper band limit. Since this measure does not depend on the observed
value of the state we multiply this quantity (of intervention) by the di!erence
between the observed exchange rate s(k) and the corresponding value under
the announced band (ga(k)), F. In this way political cost grows as you move
further towards the edge of the band or the more the policy maker deviates
from the announcement.
(ii) When the policy maker attempts to increase his credibility by adopting a w
that implies a narrower band-width than the announced he will receive a bonus
rather than a cost. Reversing the roles of the two (s, k) mappings in Figure
5 this is picked up by measuring the di!erence in the fundamentals necessary
to maintain the same exchange rate in the announced and the chosen target
zones, G.
Figure 5: Political Cost
24
The asymmetry in the upside and downside costs, apart from their sign, reflects
the nonlinearity observed in the relative credibility function. We emphasise this
by adopting di!erent exponential functions for the upside and downside political
costs as discussed in the context of risk sensitive decision making for instance by
(Whittle [1990]) and more recently by Hansen and Sargent (1992). So we have for
the loss of relative credibility term;
RCcost = polcost1 + polcost2 (19)
where
polcost1 = exp["
&
*1
2
(k¯ " kw)(gw " ga)
'
I1] (20)
polcost2 = exp["
&
*2
2
(k " ka)
'
I2] (21)
where I1 and I2 are indicator functions which denote which case applies.
The exponential specification of these terms in the cost function with di!erent
parameters will enable us to systematically incorporate asymmetric risk issues and
in particular di!erential upside and downside risks when close to the upper limit
of the announced band14.
In comparison with the standard LQG specification, where the linearity implies
only a mean-variance trade-o!, we are able to take into account, as should be
important in this non linear environment, the higher moments of the loss/benefit
associated with the political cost. These are shown explicitly by the expansion:
E[exp"(
*1
2
C(k))] = [1"
*1
2
E(C(k))+
*21
4 · 2
E(C2(k))"
*31
8 · 4 · 2
E(C3(k))+.....] (22)
The final term in the policy-maker’s objective function indicates a cumulative po-
litical cost that reflects an assumed loss from a realignment of, in general, both
the central parity and new announced band-widths. The realignment process is
a crucial part of the proposed flexible target zone. In a sense this term picks up
absolute credibility loss when the policy maker periodically decides it is optimal
to announce a new target zone. Since wider issues are involved with setting the
central parity, in the present context a realignment simply takes the form of a
14It is again interesting to note that Chittenden [1970], when considering the reform of the
Bretton Woods system, also recognised the asymmetry of costs and called for asymmetric bands.
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change in the band—width and this action is seen to be contemplated only after the
possibilities o!ered by policy coordination in reducing fundamentals divergence are
exhausted. We assume that initially the announced target zone is fully credibile
and that it has an initial quantity or stock of endowed credibility given by the size
of the speculative attack that would instantly move the level of fundamentals from
the smooth pasting point of tangency, k¯, with the upper band to the free float
level of fundamentals, kff at the same exchange rate. The policy maker may also
decide through his intervention strategy to reduce the implicit band-widths as time
proceeds and shocks to the fundamentals allow by e!ectively conducting a tighter
intervention or monetary policy than required and thereby add to his stock of ini-
tial credibility. Hence he is involved with a continuous process of investment and
consumption of his credibility stock. However once this stock of relative credibility
is used up, perhaps sometime after the upper limit of exchange rate fluctuations has
been breached, he will see it as optimal to realign and propose a new band width
corresponding to a new level of absolute credibility and the strategic game then
restarts within the new band. The band width for which the new announcement
is made is such as to leave the expectations of the private sector unchanged, so
that w = wˆg, both for widening or narrowing the band. This ensures that there
will be no jumps in the expected value of the exchange rate se before and after the
annoncement and that the relative credibility function will jump to 1 15 and the
'(rct) function is reset to ( in figure 3.
These processes of the accumulation of political costs and bonuses allow flexibil-
ity to be built into the target zone since an immediate realignment is not required
each time the policy maker, deviating from the announced path, lets the exchange
rate go above or below the exchange rate band. It is only after “enough” political
cost (bonus) is accumulated that (depending on the loss function) a realignment
in the band-width is induced. This has two advantages with respect to the rigid
target zone model.
In the first place we allow for the existence of soft bu!ers around the announced
band, as suggested by Williamson. This model provides, in e!ect a target zone with
a flexible structure which can absorb temporary shocks as well as accommodate
temporary deviation from the announced policy. This is pretty much in line with
15Whenever the announcement is equal to the level perceived by the market, relative credibility
is 1 by definition.
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the French experience after the widening of the bands of the ERM in the Summer
of 1993 and the ensuing return of the French Franc toward the old central parity,
within the ±2.25% limits16.
Secondly, the flexibility introduced leaves the markets without rigid bounds or
fixed targets against which safe bets can be placed. After a shock hits the system
and some accommodation is granted, the policy maker can revert to a more virtuous
policy avoiding an immediate realignment as long as political costs have not been
too heavy.
Given these arguments we model this last element in the objective function as;
ACcost =
t(
$=t0
+t"$ (polcost1(" )" polcost2("))
k¯(st)" kff (st)
+ ,I3 (23)
The numerator of (23) records the current value of the cumulative discounted
net political cost. The denominator indicates the size of the speculative attack
needed to bring down the announced band in one shot, and can be seen as the
natural threshold to evaluate the life—span of a band (in present discounted terms).
The decision rule becomes then to widen the band if the numerator of (23) (the
cumulated net political cost in present value) exceeds the denominator. The an-
nouncement of a wider band also attracts a lump sum cost given by , as he realigns,
shown by the indicator function I3 in expression (23). This cost reflects the loss in
absolute credibility when the band is widened and serves as an integral mechanism
on the otherwise proportional and derivative nature of the loss function. As men-
tioned above this integral mechanism acts, in many ways, as an approximation for
the deeper optimisation problem involving the determination of the central parity
and the design of cooperative policies to achieve the announced level of absolute
credibility.
Given current fundamentals, therefore, the cost of the band—width realignment
may be less than the cost of defending the older announcement, therefore induc-
ing the policy—maker to pre-empt a speculative attack. By the same token, an
announcement of a narrower band can be made when the cumulated bonuses (net
negative political cost) exceed the negative of the threshold, showing that the initial
amount at stake was accumulated by virtuous behavior.
16A companion paper Avesani, Gallo and Salmon[1995] considers the application of this model
specifically to the crisis in the ERM in 1993.
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Notice that in expression (23) the evaluation of the cumulated political cost
entails a discount to an initial time t0. This is assumed to be reset to be the
time at which each announcement occurs, so that there is equivalence (in present
discounted value terms) between the threshold and the cumulated political costs
incurred by in deviating from the announcement.
5 Optimal Sterilised Intervention Policy and Band—
Width Management: Simulation Results
The trade—o! between credibility and flexibility in the stage—wise game played
between the policy—maker and the markets is now studied by simulation. An ana-
lytical solution for the nonlinear stochastic optimisation problem facing the policy
maker would seem to be completely infeasible given that it can be expressed as:
maximize with respect to wg
J1(wg) = E
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e"#t
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!1(s" s
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2 + !4RCcost + !5ACcost
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(24)
where !1 > 0 and !2,!3,!4,!5 < 0 and RCcost and ACcost are given above in
equations (19)—(23)
subject to:
dk(t) = #dt+ $dW (t) + d%+ + d%" (25)
and
s = k+!#+
)*+,1" e%
-
s!gff
ga!fff
./
wg +
)*+e#
-
s!gff
ga!fff
.012 wˆg
012 -Ae!1(k"k) +Be!2(k"k). (26)
where * = log(1 " (). At the same time the financial markets through their
expectation formation seek to minimize their prediction errors given by the following
loss function,
J2(wˆg) =
" T
0
(s" se)2 dt (27)
through the use of the updating stochastic approximation rule,
dwˆg = )t
,
1" e
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28
where ga is the (s, k) mapping corresponding with the announced target zone.
Thus we resort to simulation of the entire game starting by simulating the funda-
mentals process in equation (2) as a discretization of the Brownian motion without
drift (# is set to 0) and with a volatility level of 10%. The time—discretization step
is taken to represent one day. At each step, the fundamentals allow for the com-
putation of the free—float and the “Bretton—Woods” solutions which, in turn, are
needed to evaluate the political cost and the flexibility terms. We treat the Bret-
ton Woods solution as e!ectively corresponding to our perfectly A-credible solution
given above and is given by a 1% band width. The results refer to 300 simulations
performed over a 2-year period.
Given the evolution of fundamentals and an initial announced band with w = 0.5
(corresponding to a band—width on the exchange rate of 6.6%) the game between the
markets and the policymaker is played out as described above. The policy maker
maximises his welfare function at each stage in a sequential open loop manner
taking into account the realisation of the fundamentals and his existing stock of
credibility and the financial markets form their expectations as to the exchange rate
in each period to minimise their loss through the selection of wˆg and then using the
appropriate (s, k) mapping.
In Figure 6a. we show a sample path (corresponding to two years) of the ex-
change rate resulting from this mechanism (in solid) with the corresponding an-
nounced bands (in dots—and—dashes). The free-float and the Bretton Woods so-
lutions are also shown, to appreciate the relative e!ort needed to adhere to the
announcement and the desire for flexibility.
There are five realignments in the two year period, the initial one leading to
a tight ERM—type situation with exchange rate bands of about 2%. This regime
lasts in place for almost one year with the choice of the policy maker inside the
band leaning towards exploiting flexibility (cf. Fig. 6c.). This corresponds to
an accumulation of political cost (within the band) which leads eventually to a
widening of the band to about 8%. Notice how in the following period the policy-
maker is virtuous in that his choices of w are above the announced level and keep
the exchange rate more towards the Bretton—Woods solution. This allows a first
narrowing of the band (which lasts almost three months) and a further narrowing
(fourth announcement) right after that. The apparent volatility in the series of w’s
corresponds to the exchange rate being well within the band and close alternatively
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to the free—float and the Bretton Woods solutions. In this region the surprise term
dominates the political cost, in what could be called a strategy of ‘hide—and—seek’
pursued by the policy—maker within the band.
The evolution of the perceived band width is portrayed in Figure 6.d which
shows a much lower degree of volatility or equivalently a higher degree of smoothness
relative to the realized w due to the viscosity in the learning mechanism. Note that
at the time of the announcement of a new band—width, there are no jumps in
the perceived credibility. The volatility in w within the band arises from the fact
that small changes in the level of sterilised intervention close to the central parity
imply large relative changes in the e!ective choice of w. There is no corresponding
volatility in the exchange rate as can be seen in Figure 6a. Once the free float level
of the exchange rate ( or equivalently the fundamentals) moves outside the band
limits w stabilises at close to unity as the monetary authorities devote their e!orts
to increasing their credibility and defending the announced band.
From the specific paths shown, it is clear (see 6a) how the bands provide “soft-
bu!ers” in Williamson’s sense, in that the exchange rate is allowed to hover above
the announced band for a period in the last quarter of the simulation. From Figure
7.b, we recognize that this last period of the simulation is characterized by some
unsterilised interventions on the fundamentals. Notice that in other cases when the
exchange rate lies beyond or at the band limits need not imply direct intervention
on the fundamentals is necessary because the latter might not yet have reached
their boundaries (a case in point is the period about six months into the simulation
where the exchange rate is at the boundary while the fundamentals are well inside
their band.) Of course, political cost is accumulated (as the exchange rate lies above
the announced level) and relative credibility depleted, but a comparison with the
free—float solution shows the benefits in terms of reduced volatility and smaller
deviations from the central parity.
In Figure 6b., we show the pattern of the fundamentals/exchange rate pairs
(each dot corresponds to a di!erent period). If the announcement were followed
throughout, we would neatly observe Krugman’s S-shaped curve; on the other hand,
when a free-float solution is followed , we observe a 450 line. The scatter reflects
the variety of band—widths realized as the result of the interaction between wg and
wˆg, the outcome of the optimisation problem of the policy-maker and of the relative
credibility granted by the private sector.
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Figure 7a. shows the evolution of the cumulated political cost (or bonus) rel-
ative to the threshold associated with the announcement. Each time the initial
endowment of relative credibility is depleted, a new regime is announced and the
figure shows how proces by which this comes about. An increasing segment of the
curves corresponds to a realized w below the announcement, and the reverse for
decreasing segments. An interesting feature can be detected right before the last
announcement where the cumulated political cost almost reaches the threshold but
given the extant level of perceived credibility at that time a realignment is avoided,
or rather deferred to a few weeks later.
The evolution of the '(rct) function (Figure 7.d) points out that when the
realised exchange rate lies within the target zone we again have frequent oscillations
in market power. The last part of the simulation period, when the exchange rate is
kept at around the upper limit of the band, is characterized by a smooth transition,
since it corresponds to a more stable evolution of w and wˆ. The evolution of relative
credibility is shown in Figure 8b and shows clearly those periods when an investment
in credibility is made or lost as the band widths are adjusted. Figure 8a shows the
realised relative credibility function corresponding to Figure 2 in the text.
Various regimes can be compared with the flexible target zone proposed here. A
fixed exchange rate regime is simulated by allowing a narrow ±1% band and forcing
a fundamentals intervention at the boundary when the exchange rate hits either the
upper or lower limit of its band. Although there are wider issues surrounding the
simulation of an ERM equivalent system relating to their assumed full credibility
we consider narrow and broad band versions which are simulated as in the fixed
exchange rate case by widening the band on the exchange rate to ±2.25%, and,
±15% respectively. Finally, the free-float would be characterized by the absence of
interventions and by a yearly level of volatility in the exchange rate equal to that
of the fundamentals. A comparison between these regimes is shown in Table 1 by
comparing the non—strategic part of the objective function, namely
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relative to the same level achieved in the free float case. Next to it we present
the levels of fundamentals intervention d%+ and d%" (in present discounted value)
needed to achieve it. Notice that at times the flexible target zone has narrower
band-widths than the narrow ERM option.
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Table 1: Stabilization and Intervention Comparisons
Percentage of free float Interventions
Non. Strategic Obj.Fun Above Below
Flexible TZ 3.69% 0.0395 0.0382
Fixed 0.50% 0.0569 0.0575
ERM (narrow) 2.47% 0.0370 0.0363
ERM (broad) 51.1% 0.0042 0.0030
Table 2: Private Sector Objective Function: Comparisons
set Mean St.Dev.
st(wˆ) 0.0071 0.001
st"1 0.0101 0.003
st(w
a) 0.0368 0.012
sbw 0.0896 0.015
sff 0.9042 0.442
The results show that the amount of overall stabilization achieved by the flexible
target zone proposed here is much higher than the level in the Broad Band case ,
which in turn is not unnaturally lower than the free float result. Remember that
the value of relative credibility in the ERM cases is set to unity exogenously, and
no band—width realignments are allowed. The stabilising properties of the flexible
target zone are impressive when compared with the narrow ERM case given that
the flexible target zone spent extended periods with a wider band width than the
narrow ERM.
On the financial markets’ side, it is interesting to consider whether the stochastic
approximation used in forming their expectations for wg is optimal with respect to
several obvious alternatives. In Table (2) we report the calculated loss over the
simulation period in each case.
This simple comparison shows that the chosen rule to update the perceived
credibility does indeed minimize the mean sample forecast error. The second row
contains the outcome obtained by setting the expectations equal to the previous
period’s level of the exchange rate and we can then see that there is a clear gain
from using the assumed wˆ rule over the random walk hypothesis.
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Table 3: Exchange Rate Statistical Properties
Mean St.Dev.
Skewness -0.0012 1.070
Kurtosis 0.1861 1.851
ARCH(4) 548.74 43.00
The third row computes the criterion for the case in which the private sector
constantly sets its expectations at the announced level of the exchange rate. Just
trusting the announcement (row 3) then would entail a larger mean forecast error,
given the frequent deviations of w from it. The last two rows set the benchmarks
of using Bretton Woods and the free—float as the expectation updating rule, and
should be read just to give an upper bound to the value of the objective function.
Finally, in Table (3) and Figure 8d we examine the properties of the exchange
rates as they come out of the simulation with flexible band-widths. In particular, it
is interesting to note that for the entire period the behavior of the estimated density
of the exchange rate does not exhibit the U-shaped pattern as implied by the per-
fectly credible or “ Krugman” solution, as a result of the non—constant w used. Note
also that the series itself contains a high degree of conditional heteroskedasticity
and clearly has a leptokurtic distribution.
Although the discussion above relates to a simulation exercise, it is possible to
use the model to derive an estimated relative credibility measure for an historically
observed exchange rate path. This process is discussed in more detail in Avesani,
Gallo and Salmon[1995] where the French Franc/ DM experience is analysed over
the period of the enlargement of the band in August 1993. The results in brief are
encouraging since the estimated measure of credibility from this optimising model
closely matches that which can be inferred from contemporary press accounts.
6 Conclusions
One basic rationale for a target zone is to grant policymakers a certain degree of
independence in setting their monetary policy while reaping the benefits of an in-
creased exchange rate stability, as argued for on somewhat di!erent grounds by
Williamson [1983] and Svensson [1992]. The suggestion put forward in this paper
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extends this view by showing how the proposed strategic game allows the desire for
greater flexibility to be fulfilled at the expense of a reduction in the policymaker’s
credibility. In one sense this work could therefore be seen as an attempt to provide
a more mathematical basis for the notion of flexible target zones as put forward by
John Williamson. We have also tried to conduct a straight-forward economic mod-
elling excercise by attempting to capture aspects of reality not present in existing
target zone models. In particular we have concentrated on developing a model that
implies frequent sterilised intramarginal interventions and have emphasised the sig-
nalling channel of such interventions in altering the financial market’s expectations
rather than unsterilised fundamental interventions.
This formalisation of partial credibility has helped us uncover a basic trade-
o! which lies at the heart of any target zone between credibility and flexibility in
a strategic environment. In the proposed model the evolution of credibility and
monetary flexibility emerges from the strategic interaction between policy-makers
and markets instead of being determined by some exogenous process. The sequen-
tial open loop nature of the optimisation process given forward looking exchange
rate determination perhaps mimics reality rather more accurately than a standard
infinite horizon intertemporal dynamic game.
The learning process of the financial markets with respect to the policy-maker’s
objectives is crucial. In formalizing it we stressed two aspects. In the first place
the announcement of the band by the policy-maker establishes the level of absolute
credibility at which the system is evolving. Secondly, observations on the realised
exchange rate - fundamentals relationship allow the market to evaluate the degree
of commitment the policy-maker has to the announced band, in other words the
policy maker’s relative credibility, and to revise its own expectations through an
appropriate updating mechanism.
At each stage the monetary authority determines its optimal policy in the foreign
exchange market taking into account the markets view of its credibility and its basic
desires for flexibility and exchange rate stabilisation. Deviations of the policy-
maker from its announced policy are penalized or rewarded in a state dependent
and asymmetric way. The accumulation of costs and benefits triggers a realignment
and the announcement of a new band-width by the policy-maker when they reach a
threshold dictated by the parameters characterizing the policy-maker’s preferences
and the underlying model. Therefore the process of realignment is part of an
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optimising strategic policy on the part of the monetary authorities rather than
being forced by the markets. The contrast between the case with a fixed target
zone is clear.
In terms of testable implications our approach shows that the distribution of
the exchange rate within the band has a mass clustered around the central par-
ity in accordance with observed data. In other words we do not have to resort
to realignments in the central parity, as in Bertola-Caballero [1991], in order to
remove the probability masses concentrated at the two boundaries which charac-
terizes the fully credible target zone model. Secondly, the dynamic management
of the band-width endogenously creates leptokurtosis and an ARCH e!ect in the
observed exchange rate series. It is important to recognise that while the evolution
of fundamentals is characterized by constant volatility it is the exchange rate policy
chosen by the policy maker which defines period by period the evolving volatility of
the exchange rate. So we find a time-varying exchange rate volatility even though
the fundamentals volatility is constant.
The practical policy implications of our analysis emphasise the central impor-
tance of measuring credibility in the optimal management of a flexible target zone.
It has been suggested that the adoption of a flexible approach with a commitment
to maintain an exchange rate within an announced band to an extent determined
by the policy maker’s perceived credibility would stabilise exchange rates and re-
duce the possibility of speculative attacks that arise with inflexible target zones.
The feedback nature of the intervention policy of the central bank, both on the
fundamentals and the exchange rate o!ers a completely di!erent rationalisation for
policy than that suggested by the open loop precommitment that has historically
been found in existing target zones.
This form of flexible policy response would seem, by default, to have been that
practiced by the Banque de France in 1993. What we have suggested above is a
framework within which such realignments may be systematically analysed and the
optimal response determined. For instance we doubt whether the “ new” band-
widths of 15% in the ERM are optimal in any sense. In fact in Avesani, Gallo and
Salmon [1995] we calculate that the optimal band-width adjustment at that time
would have been to 7.9%.
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